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Abstract
This paper describes an approach to modeling the evolution of non-secure applications into secure applications in terms of the
software requirements model and software architecture model. The requirements for security services are captured separately from
application requirements, and the security services are encapsulated in connectors in the software architecture, separately from
the components providing functional services. The enterprise architecture is described in terms of use case models, static models,
and dynamic models. The software architecture is described in terms of components and connectors, which can be deployed to
distributed configurations. By separating application concerns from security concerns, the evolution from a non-secure application
to a secure application can be achieved with less impact on the application. An electronic commerce system is described to illustrate
the approach.
c© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Many applications have been developed without considering security services such as confidentiality, integrity,
access control, and non-repudiation. As software security is becoming more important in business these days, non-
secure applications need to evolve to become secure applications. Several approaches have been suggested to address
this problem [1,2,12,14,16,19,26], but these approaches mainly focus on the treatment of security in a specific phase
of software development, such as requirements modeling or software architecture. Therefore, it is necessary for a
systematic approach to evolve a non-secure application into a secure application.
In this paper, the enterprise architecture is described in terms of use case models, static models, and dynamic
models. Furthermore, the software architecture is described in terms of components and connectors, which can be
deployed to distributed configurations. In the evolution of a non-secure application to a secure application, security
concerns in the software requirements model and software architecture need to be separated from application concerns,
so that the application can be more maintainable. Security requirements are often considered to be non-functional
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requirements, but they lead to functional requirements for realizing security services [16,27]. These security functions
need to be modeled separately from application functions, in both the requirements model and software architecture
model, as a non-secure application evolves into a secure application.
This paper describes how to model the evolution of a non-secure application to a secure application in terms of
the requirements model and software architecture model, which are both described using the UML notation [3,21].
By careful separation of concerns in the software requirements model, security requirements for security services
are modeled distinctly from application requirements. The security services modeled in the requirements model are
encapsulated in connectors separately from components in the software architecture. Separation of security concerns
from application concerns makes a secure application more evolvable and maintainable. It should be pointed out
that this paper addresses software application security. It is assumed that operating system and network security
mechanisms (for the platforms on which the secure applications execute) are already provided to address security
vulnerabilities exploited by viruses, worms, hackers, and other malicious intrusions, and denial of service attacks.
This paper begins by describing the work related to this paper in Section 2. Section 3 describes the overview of
our approach. Section 4 describes the evolution of the requirements model for secure applications. Section 5 describes
evolving to a secure software architecture from the non-secure software architecture. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2. Related work
Related work addresses security issues in software requirements and architectures. The security requirements for
making a system secure are specified on the basis of security constraints, which are derived from the result of threat
analysis. Threats to a system are identified for each asset [16] that should be protected against misuse cases [1,26] or
abuse cases [15,28]. The process of deriving security requirements for a secure application is described in [16], which
also shows relationships between security constraints and security functions.
The misuse case model [1,26] is a method for inferring security requirements from misuse cases. Use cases of an
application and their misuse cases are modeled using a “threaten” relationship [1], and then the security requirements
for a system are defined to protect against or mitigate misuse cases [1,26]. Similarly, the abuse case modeling [15,28]
describes the harms to the system in the interaction between a system and actors, exploiting security privileges to find
out the causes of harms. The security requirements are represented as security functions [16,27] that are required to
be implemented in a secure system.
Security aspects can be plugged into the software architecture for a secure system using the connectors [2,19],
which are viewed as the glue binding the components. The customized connectors can contain security services,
which are specified using a Module Interconnection Language (MIL) [2]. A connector [19] that supports an access
control security service can be specified using an extended Architecture Description Language, XML-based extensible
ADL (xADL).
The UML is an industrial standard for object-oriented modeling. There are several efforts to model security aspects
using the UML notation [11] or to extend the UML notation for security modeling [12,14]. Security use cases are
modeled separately from application use cases using an extension relationship in the use case model, and security
objects are modeled separately from application objects in the analysis model [11]. The UML notation is enriched
by including new stereotypes relevant to modeling security aspects [12]. The security constraints are specified at the
meta-model [14] level from which a system model can be instantiated.
3. Overview of approach
In this paper, by careful separation of concerns, security requirements are modeled separately from the application
requirements, and the security requirements are committed if the application requires security services [11]. In the
software architecture, the security services are encapsulated in connectors separately from the components that provide
the functionality of an application. The connectors perform security operations if the application requires security
services.
Security requirements are captured in security use cases and are encapsulated in security objects. Security use cases
are extended from application use cases if the security requirement conditions are satisfied. Similarly, security classes
are specialized from the application classes if the application needs to be secure.
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Fig. 1. Secure software architecture with components and connectors.
The software architecture [4,7,23] for concurrent and distributed applications can be designed by means of
components and connectors. The components address the functionality of an application, whereas connectors deal
with communication between components. Each component defines functionality that is relatively independent of
functions provided by other components. A component may request services from other components, or provide
services to them through connectors. A connector acts on behalf of components in terms of communication between
components, encapsulating the details of inter-component communication.
As a non-secure application evolves to be a secure application, security services are encapsulated in connectors
between the components of the software architecture. The original role of connectors in the software architecture is
to provide a mechanism for message communication between components. In order to support application security at
the software architecture level as the non-secure software architecture evolves into a secure software architecture, the
role of connectors has been extended by adding security objects to the connectors, which are then referred to as secure
connectors.
The security goals such as confidentiality, integrity, access control, and non-repudiation can be achieved by
secure connectors that control interaction between components in the software architecture. Confidentiality services
preventing secret information from being disclosed to any unauthorized party can be achieved by secure connectors
encapsulating cryptosystems, while integrity services protecting against unauthorized changes to data can be
performed by secure connectors using message digest (MD) or message authentication code (MAC) [18]. Similarly,
secure connectors are involved in access control by protecting against unauthorized access to resources, and non-
repudiation by protecting against one party to a transaction later falsely denying that the transaction occurred. Access
control can be implemented using mandatory access control (MAC), while non-repudiation security services may be
realized using digital signatures [6].
In this paper, the components in the software architecture will have minimal changes as the non-secure software
architecture evolves to the secure software architecture. Some security service encapsulated in a secure connector
may require input for performing the security service. In that case, a component connecting to the secure connector is
modified to become a secure component that provides the input for the security service.
Fig. 1 depicts the secure software architecture of a distributed application structured into components and their
connectors, which has evolved from a non-secure software architecture. The components and connectors are active
objects (concurrent objects) that have their own threads of control. In UML, a concurrent object is represented by a
rectangle with side bars (e.g., Component2 in Fig. 1). Component1 communicates with Component2 and Component3
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Fig. 2. Browse catalog with access control security use case in electronic commerce system.
via Connector1 and Connector3 respectively. While some components become secure components (e.g., Secure
Component1), other components such as Component2 and Component3 remain unchanged. When an application
evolves into a secure application, a connector becomes a secure connector if it provides security services (e.g., Secure
Connector1). Secure connectors get keys from a key component in order to provide secure message communication
between components. However, key management is outside the scope of this paper.
4. Evolution in requirements models for secure applications
When modeling enterprise architectures using UML [3,21], enterprise applications are viewed through multiple
views [10] — a functional requirements view is achieved through use case modeling, a static view is achieved using
class modeling, and a dynamic view through object communication modeling.
4.1. Use case modeling
As a non-secure application evolves into a secure application, the security use cases are modeled separately from
the application use cases. Use case modeling is used to model an application’s functional requirements by means of
non-secure business use cases and to separately model the security requirements by means of security use cases [11].
When the application requires security services, the security use cases are extended from the non-secure business
use cases at extension points. An extension point [3,21] is a location where a use case extends another use case if the
proper condition holds. The business use cases specify the functionality of applications. They provide extension points
where a security use case extends an application use case, if the appropriate security requirement condition holds. The
security use cases can have parameters, whose values are passed from the business use cases that they extend.
An example of the evolution of non-secure application use cases to security use cases is shown in a UML use
case diagram (Fig. 2). In a use case for Browse Catalog in an electronic commerce system, a customer browses
through various WWW catalogs and views various catalog items from a given supplier’s catalog. The Browse Catalog
business use case is extended to the Access Control security use case, shaded in gray, if the application requires
security services. A customer may need permission to access a specific catalog. This security concern is captured in a
separate security use case — Access Control (Catalog). Access Control (Catalog), a security use case, extends Browse
Catalog, an application use case, at an extension point called Access Permission, if the application needs to control
access to catalogs.
The following describes specifications for Browse Catalog application use case and Access Control security use
case.
Use Case Name: Browse Catalog
Summary: Customer chooses a catalog to browse.
Actor: Customer
Precondition: System is ready.
Description (Base use case):
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1. Customer chooses to view a catalog index.
2. System displays catalog index.
3. User requests to view a specific catalog.
4.<access permission>
5. System reads the catalog and displays it.
Alternatives:
Postcondition: Customer has browsed a catalog.
In the above example, for a non-secure application where the security condition [Catalog Requires Access Control]
is false, step 4 in the Browse Catalog use case is a null function. For a secure application where the security condition
[Catalog Requires Access Control] is true, step 4 <access permission> in Browse Catalog is replaced by the Access
Control extension use case given below:
Use Case Name: Access Control (Object)
Summary: System authorizes customer or supplier access to object.
Dependency: Extension use case for several use cases.
Actor: Customer
Precondition: Customer or supplier is authenticated as a legitimate user.
Description:
1. Using customer or supplier identity information, the system checks whether customer or supplier has permission
to access an {object}.
2. If customer has permission, system permits customer or supplier to gain access to the {object}.
Alternatives:
1. If customer does not have permission to access the {object}, the system displays Access Denied message.
Postcondition: System has permitted customer or supplier to gain access to an {object}.
4.2. Static modeling
The static model is used in UML to depict the static structural view of an application by modeling classes. The static
model defines the classes in the application, their attributes and relationships between classes. There are three types
of relationship among classes: associations, composition/aggregation, and generalization/specialization relationships.
Using a generalization/specialization hierarchy, the static model of a non-secure application, which consists
of non-secure application classes, is extended through inheritance to provide security service classes providing
security services. Security concerns are separated from business concerns by modeling non-secure application classes
separately from security service classes.
Fig. 3 depicts the evolution of Customer Interface and Customer Agent application classes to secure Customer
Interface and secure Customer Agent security classes in an electronic commerce system. The Customer Agent acts
on behalf of the human customer to assist the Customer who orders items. The Customer Interface and Customer
Agent application classes that provide non-secure business services are specialized respectively to secure Customer
Interface and secure Customer Agent security classes that provide secure services if the security requirement condition
is satisfied—Catalog requires access control. Each class is depicted with a stereotype, e.g., «user interface», «business
logic», «security service», or «database wrapper» (Fig. 4), which represents the role played by the class in the
application.
4.3. Dynamic modeling
The communication model is used to depict the objects that participate in each use case, and the sequence of
messages passed between them. Once the use cases have been determined, the corresponding communication diagrams
can be developed.
As described in Section 4.1, security concerns can be addressed in the use case model by extending the non-secure
base use case with a secure extension use case; the secure extension use case is executed if the security condition is
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Fig. 3. Generalization/specialization hierarchy for Customer Interface and Customer Agent classes.
true. This concept can be realized in the dynamic communication model by providing a conditional message sequence,
which represents a conditional path consisting of objects and messages [10]. Execution of the conditional sequence is
guarded by a security requirement condition. Security concerns are separated from the application’s business concerns
by modeling non-secure application objects separately from security objects [11]. Security concerns captured in
separate use cases are encapsulated in separate security objects. If a security requirement condition is true, meaning
that the application needs to be secure, non-secure objects communicate with security objects through an alternative
message sequence.
Fig. 4 depicts a communication diagram for Browse Catalog with security use case that addresses catalog security
when the application requires access control for Catalog (Fig. 2). If Catalog requires access control, Secure Customer
Agent requests Access Control Agent to authorize customer access to a specific catalog (message sequence A2.2
through A2.5). Access Control security service is provided by the Access Control Agent and Access Control Server
objects. Depending on an organization’s access control policy, Access Control Agent authorizes customer access to
an object using access control data stored in Access Control Server. The security requirement condition [Catalog
requires access control] is used to control whether the security service is accessed or not. The security requirement
condition is the same as that used for the extension condition in the use case model (Fig. 2). If the condition is true,
the base use case (Browse Catalog in Fig. 2) is extended by the Access Control security use case. The security use
case is realized in the communication model by the Secure Customer Agent object in Fig. 4, which, if the security
requirement condition holds, directs the customer’s request for a catalog to the Access Control Agent, which in turn
requests the access control data from the Access Control Server to authorize the customer’s request.
5. Evolution of software architectures for secure applications
As a non-secure application evolves to become a secure application, the components in the non-secure application
may need to be changed to support the evolution. Some security services encapsulated in secure connectors require
input from components, which is used to compute security values. For example, an access control security service
relies on customer identity to check the customer’s access permission to a specific resource. Other components
can remain unchanged in the evolution to a secure software architecture. For instance, confidentiality and integrity
security services do not need any input for encrypting/decrypting messages and checking message authentication. The
components requiring confidentiality and integrity security services remain unchanged in the evolution to the secure
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Fig. 4. Communication diagram for Browse Catalog with access control security use case.
software architecture. This is because these components do not need to provide input, such as customer identity, to
the secure connectors acting on behalf of the components.
5.1. Modeling secure components and connectors
When the application requires security services, a non-secure component in the software architecture must evolve
to become a secure component. This is achieved by specializing classes in the non-secure component to become secure
classes. A component can be considered a composite or aggregate class that contains the simple classes constituting
the component. The simple classes in a component may need to support the evolution of the software architecture for
a secure application. Therefore, a non-secure component becomes a secure component as the simple classes contained
in the component evolve to become secure classes.
Fig. 3 depicts a secure Customer component in an electronic commerce system that evolves from a non-secure
Customer component. The Customer Interface and Customer Agent classes need to provide an access control security
service to check the customer access permission to a resource. To provide secure access control, the Customer Interface
and Customer Agent classes are specialized to become secure classes. As a result, the composite non-secure Customer
component evolves to become the corresponding Secure Customer component.
A non-secure connector evolves to become a secure connector by encapsulating security services such as
confidentiality, integrity, access control, and non-repudiation. In the software architecture for a distributed application,
connectors encapsulate the details of message communication between components. Connectors can be designed for
sending a message to a component (referred to as a sender connector) and receiving a message from a component
(referred to as a receiver connector) [9]. To implement a security service, a sender connector and/or a receiver
connector contain security classes to provide the security service.
The confidentiality security service can be achieved using a cryptosystem that encrypts a plain message into a
cipher message and decrypts the cipher message received into a plain message. A sender connector encapsulates
security classes relevant to encryption of a plain message, whereas a receiver connector contains security classes
associated with decryption of a cipher message to a plain message. The security objects (instances of security classes)
are executed if the application requires a confidentiality security service.
The integrity security service can be fulfilled by a message digest (MD) or message authentication code (MAC)
that checks the authenticity of messages communicated between components. A sender connector has security objects
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Fig. 5. Evolution of Catalog Connector.
generating a message digest or a message authentication code for a message being sent. The message digest (or
message authentication code) is sent to the destination, along with the original message. A receiver connector is
supported by security objects, which check the integrity of the received message by means of comparing the received
message digest (or message authentication code) with the message digest (or message authentication code) generated
by the receiver using the received message. These security objects are performed if the application requires integrity
security service.
The non-repudiation security service can be realized using digital signature that signs a message with the signature
of the message originator. A sender connector contains security objects signing a message being sent with the
originator’s signature, whereas a receiver connector encapsulates security objects that prove the authenticity of the
received signature using a key (e.g., public key of the originator). These security objects in the secure connectors are
activated if the application requires a non-repudiation security service.
The access control security service can be implemented using discretionary (DAC), mandatory (MAC) or role-
based access control (RBAC) [22], which allows a user to gain access to an object based on the access control policies.
A sender connector might not contain security objects, while a receiver connector contains security objects that check
a user’s access permission to an object. These security objects are executed if the application requires an access control
security service.
Continuing with the catalog example (see Fig. 2), Fig. 5 depicts a structure of Catalog connector that controls
the access to Catalog. The non-secure Catalog connector is supported by the Catalog Server Message Buffer and
Catalog Server Stub, which communicate with each other via ports [3,21]. The secure Catalog connector replaces
the Catalog Server Stub with Secure Catalog Server Stub, and contains security objects – Access Control Agent and
Access Control Server (Figs. 4 and 5) – if catalog requires access control. In the secure Catalog connector, the Secure
Catalog Server Stub has a port through which it communicates with a port of the Access Control Agent in order to
check user access permission to a Catalog.
5.2. Modeling secure component interfaces and interconnections
A component has one or more ports through which it interacts with other components [8]. Each port is defined in
terms of provided and/or required interfaces. A provided interface of a port specifies the requests that are required
by other components. A required interface of a port specifies the requests that this component requires from other
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Fig. 6. Ports, provided and required interfaces of Secure Catalog Server Stub and Access Control Agent objects.
components. A provided port is a port that supports a provided interface. A required port is a port that supports
a required interface. A complex port is a port that supports both a provided interface and a required interface.
A component can support more than one port. In particular, if a component communicates with more than one
component, it can use a different port for each component it communicates with.
Fig. 6 depicts Secure Catalog Server Stub and Access Control Agent components with ports as well as provided and
required interfaces. The name of a component’s required port starts with the letter R to emphasize that the component
has a required port. The name of a component’s provided port starts with the letter P to emphasize the component
has a provided port. The Secure Catalog Server Stub (Fig. 6) has four required ports – RNetwork, RAccessControl,
RCatalog, and RMessageBuffer. The Access Control Agent (Fig. 6) has a required port – RKeyServer – and a provided
port – PAccessControl. Fig. 7 shows the definition of interfaces of ports of Secure Catalog Server Stub and Access
Control Agent.
Fig. 8 depicts a UML communication diagram for the synchronous message communication for controlling the
access to the catalog. When a Customer component requests a catalog index, the connectors between the Customer
and Catalog Server components deliver the index to the Customer component from the Catalog Server component
(message sequence A1 through A1.6). Along with a customer identity, the request for a catalog selected by a customer
is sent by a Secure Synchronous Customer connector to a Secure Synchronous Catalog connector (A2 through A2.2),
which checks the permission of the customer to gain access to the catalog (A2.3 through A2.5). If the customer
has permission to access the catalog, the Secure Catalog Server Stub requests the catalog from the Catalog Server
component (A2.6). Fig. 8 describes the collaboration of components and connectors at the software architecture level,
whereas Fig. 4 describes the collaboration of objects at the analysis modeling level.
6. Conclusions
This paper has described the evolution of a non-secure application to a secure application by evolving both the
requirements model and the software architecture. By careful separation of concerns, security requirements for
security services and the software architecture for supporting the security services are modeled separately from
application concerns. Security requirements are captured in security use cases and are encapsulated in security objects.
The security services are encapsulated in connectors separately from the components that provide the functionality of
the application. The security services are invoked if the security requirement conditions are satisfied.
In this paper, the evolution of a non-secure application to a secure application is based around the concept
of security requirement conditions. When a security requirement condition is true, the corresponding security
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Fig. 7. Interfaces for Secure Catalog Server Stub and Access Control Agent.
Fig. 8. Communication diagram for secure software architecture for E-Commerce system.
requirement is achieved using a security use case and security objects to provide the security service. In addition,
when the security requirement condition holds, the corresponding secure connector in the software architecture fulfills
the security services encapsulated in the connector. By separating application concerns from security concerns, the
evolution from a non-secure application to a secure application can be achieved with less impact on the application.
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Because the approach is built on distributed software architectures using components and connectors, which can be
deployed to highly distributed configurations [7], the approach described in this paper is scaleable to large enterprise
applications. Validation of the approach is provided through case studies. The non-secure version of the requirements
model and software architecture for the E-Commerce system is described in detail in [8]. The secure version of the
E-Commerce system described in [11,24] and in this paper. Further validation would necessitate the implementation
and testing of the secure application.
The secure modeling approach described in this paper can be further extended to address threat modeling in an
application. Threat modeling is used to identify the assets of an application that could be harmed if the application
is not secure. The security requirements for protecting the assets can be derived from the threat model for the
application. Modeling threats to assets in an application is a starting point for evolving to a secure application.
This approach can also be supported by a method and supporting tool that checks the consistency between the
requirements model and software architecture for the evolved secure application. Future work involves investigating
aspect-oriented modeling for separating business and security concerns. In addition, the secure requirements model
and secure software architecture model for a secure application can be analyzed to check the dynamic behavior [5,17,
25] of the system using executable models such as Rational Rose Real-time [20], or Colored Petri Nets [13], or by
implementation using a high level programming language.
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